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ABSTRACT 
Tax auditing parameters have been largely overlooked by the literature as policy-making 
instruments of any relevance; however, enforcement strategies are critical elements of the tax 
burden. In this paper we show that, in a federal framework, tax auditing policies can serve as 
additional tools for regional interaction. We examine the presence of this interaction by 
adopting a spatial econometric approach. We employ a spatial panel autoregressive model and 
obtain results that are congruent with standard theory, corroborating the presence of horizontal 
competition between regions in their tax auditing policies. We also find that once regional 
governments acquire legal power, the opaque competition in enforcement policies appears to 
switch in part to a more transparent competition in statutory tax parameters. 
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1. Introduction 
Enforcement strategies are crucial elements in the tax management process since they help 
determine the level and distribution of effective tax rates (e.g. Johns & Slemrod, 2010; Traxler, 
2011) and, hence, the total amount of tax revenues collected. Moreover, these strategies are of 
particular interest to federal countries, as auditing policies can represent a second, additional, 
tax instrument in the hands of sub-central authorities (Besfamille et al., 2012) – along with the 
setting of statutory tax parameters – on which they can interact. Yet, the possibility of tax 
enforcement interdependence has received limited attention in the literature (with notable 
exceptions being Janeba & Peters, 1999; Cremer & Gahvari, 2000 and, Stöwhase & Traxler, 
2005) and, to the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical studies investigating the 
presence of these interactions, which might be due to an absence of data on auditing policies 
and/or the difficulties in finding an adequate measure to represent the level of “tax 
enforcement”.  
 
We aim to fill this gap in the literature by analysing the presence of horizontal tax 
interdependence between sub-central administrations in a federal context. In Spain, regional 
governments, the so-called “Comunidades Autónomas” (henceforth CAs), have had the power 
to administer several wealth taxes since the mid-eighties, first without any legal authority to 
modify the rule, though following reforms in 1997 and 2002 they did obtain the legislative 
power to modify significant tax parameters
1
. Here, we focus specifically on the Inheritance and 
Gift Tax (IGT), the main decentralized tax on wealth, which has recently become the subject of 
considerable debate both in Spain and in other countries
2
. There is evidence that the 
decentralization of the IGT in federal countries can induce a race to the bottom in statutory tax 
                                                     
1
 More specifically, following the 1997 reform, CAs were permitted to modify their tax rate schedules in 
line with national schedules. Following the 2002 reform, CAs were granted complete legislative control 
over the tax rates ceded to them by the central government. For a more precise description of these 
reforms see Esteller-Moré (2008). 
2
 Taxing wealth and wealth transfers is generally unpopular and has become the subject of debate in 
several OECD countries, including United States and Canada. In Europe, the UK case is highly 
illustrative: the IGT is popularly ostracized because it raises relatively little revenue, but it is 
characterized by an excessively high flat rate (40%). Likewise, it raises issues about double taxation as 
well as about the absence of effects on wealth distribution (Boadway et al., 2010). 
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parameters (see, for example, Bird, 1991, Conway & Rork, 2004; Brülhart & Parchet, 2011)
3
.  
The origin of this process is the mobility, or simply the threat of mobility, of tax bases
4
. A 
similar effect has been documented for the Spanish case (see Durán-Cabré & Esteller-Moré 
2010; López-Casasnovas & Durán-Sindreu, 2008), provoking an academic and a more general 
debate
5. The Spanish press headlines on these issues are symptomatic: “Cheaper Gifts and 
Inheritances”; “Regional Tax Competition”; “The Fiscal War among Regions Threatens the 
IGT”; “Regional Taxation and Voting with Feet”6. These articles seem to corroborate the 
presence of mobility-based competition in the regional IGT statutory tax parameters
7
. Similarly, 
we hypothesize that the same type of competition between regions occurred even before the 
decentralization of legal power, in the form of opaque competition on tax enforcement since it is 
the effective tax rate that conditions mobility.  
 
The objective of our paper, therefore, is to test the existence of interaction between 
                                                     
3
 Recently, the European Commission has shown interest in such issues and even though they might arise 
under different circumstances – cross-border discrimination and double taxation, it would seem to 
confirm that questions surrounding the inheritance tax are of growing concern to European citizens 
(European Commission, 2011). 
4
 In a decentralized framework, when the principle of residence is applied, an individual finds it profitable 
to move his fiscal residence to the region with the lowest IGT rate so as to reduce the bequest tax burden.  
5
 Spain’s IGT is levied on all goods received from the deceased, valued in accordance with market 
criteria. As such, a progressive tax schedule subjects heirs (usually the spouse and the descendants) to a 
high tax liability if they have inherited valuable goods. For this reason, tax avoidance is especially 
attractive for these taxpayers. As the IGT is residence-based, the deceased’s place of residence is key to 
determining where the inheritors pay the tax and how much they are required to pay. All in all, these 
circumstances encourage agents, in particular the wealthy elderly, to act strategically given the incentives 
to elude payment of this tax. 
6
 The articles quoted are “Donaciones y sucesiones más baratas, y peajes por encima del IPC”, ABC, 
02/01/2008 (available at: http://goo.gl/douJz); “La competencia fiscal autonómica”, El Periódico de 
Catalunya 24/10/2007; “La guerra fiscal entre comunidades amenaza el tributo sobre las herencias”, El 
País 06/05/2007 (available at: http://goo.gl/Ekcdw) and “Imposición autonómica y voto con los pies”, 
Expansion 22-03-2011 (available at: http://goo.gl/QCzwS). Among other articles see  “Las Cámaras 
detectan ‘fuga’ de empresas de Cataluña por la competencia fiscal”, El Mundo 21/07/2007 (available at: 
http://goo.gl/6DPP6); “Rosell advierte de que Cataluña puede salir perjudicada por la competencia fiscal 
con otras autonomias”, El País  04/07/2006; “Madrid atrae herencias catalanas que buscan pagar menos 
impuestos”, El Periódico de Catalunya 22/07/2007; (available at: http://goo.gl/Sr0Bd) and “Grandes 
bufetes eligen sitios fuera de Cataluña y Andalucía para sus clientes”, Expansión 05/07/2007 (available 
at: http://goo.gl/i9Ojj). 
7
 This mobility can be real but also spurious or fictitious. This is confirmed by the results of a recent 
survey conducted among tax professionals working in Spain (see Durán-Cabré & Esteller-Moré, 2014). 
65% of respondents agreed in part or fully with the statement that “Regional differences in the inheritance 
tax have provoked fictitious changes in people’s fiscal residence”. This impression is further confirmed 
by informal conversations that the authors have maintained with former directors of the regional tax 
authorities.  
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decentralized administrations when setting their parameters. To achieve this, we develop a 
model of horizontal competition using the tax instrument of the audit rate, and empirically test 
its findings. The results of the theoretical framework are in line with the literature on tax rate 
competition: the threat of mobility tames the revenue maximizing administrations that compete 
in a race to the bottom over their tax instrument so as not to lose their tax bases
8
. We derive the 
slope of the administration’s reaction function and obtain a positive sign. We proceed to test this 
result using a spatial econometric approach and estimating a spatial panel autoregressive model 
(see Anselin et al., 2008). Our results validate the presence of horizontal interdependence 
between the regions and are coherent with the tax competition model. Moreover, we obtain an 
additional result: following the decentralization of legislative power on statutory tax parameters 
we observe a reduction of the competition in enforcement policies at the regional level. It seems 
that a substitution of instruments occurs: an opaque source of tax competition is partially 
substituted by a transparent one. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a summary of the 
relevant literature, then the theoretical framework is developed and the empirical analysis 
performed. Finally, we conclude. 
 
2. Literature review 
This study is closely related to the vast literature on taxation policy interactions between 
governments and, in particular, to that research line that deals with horizontal tax competition 
(see Brennan & Buchanan, 1980; Zodrow & Mieszkosky, 1986; and Wilson, 1986). This 
approach analyses a decentralized framework in which local governments compete in a race to 
the bottom when fixing tax rates in order to gain or, at least not to lose, their tax bases. The 
                                                     
8
 As Brueckner notes: “It is important to realize that for strategic interaction (and thus the race to the 
bottom) to materialize, all that is required is a perception on the part of state governments that generous 
benefits attract welfare migrants” (Brueckner, 2000, p. 508). In our case, rather than generous benefits, it 
is lax tax auditing policies that can attract taxpayers (or disincentive them to leave), or at least it is 
perceived in this way by the tax administration. 
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mobility or simply the threat of mobility of capital and people reduces government discretion to 
set tax rates at an optimal level with the effect of tax revenue reductions
9
.  
 
This literature has offered limited attention to enforcement policies although they represent 
critical elements in the tax management process. The papers investigating these issues solely 
focused on the case of between-countries tax enforcement competition and the most relevant 
theoretical contribution in this sense is that of Cremer & Gahvari (2000). Using a welfare 
maximizing framework, they examine the implications of tax evasion for fiscal competition and 
tax harmonization policies in an economic union. The countries have the power to set both tax 
rates and tax audit policies. In a closed economy framework, allowing for tax evasion increases 
the marginal cost of public funds and reduces the level of public good provision. From our 
perspective the most interesting result of the paper concerns the economic union of two tax-
evading countries. In this setting, the states engage in mobility-based competition that produces 
less than optimal equilibrium values of both tax and audit rates. Harmonization policies can 
theoretically circumvent this problem but, according to the authors, coordinating audit strategies 
may be problematic because it is difficult for the government of one country to observe and 
verify the enforcement efforts of the other. For this reason, although a harmonization policy on 
tax rates is effective in circumventing tax rate sub-optimality, it is not sufficient for avoiding the 
inefficient outcome of the auditing rate: since member states are no longer allowed to compete 
over tax rates, they lower their effective rates by cutting their auditing probabilities. 
 
A further contribution to this literature is provided by Stöwhase & Traxler (2005) who analyse 
the implications of different equalization systems on regional enforcement policies in a federal 
framework taking the statutory tax rates as being exogenously fixed at the central level. The 
                                                     
9
 The applied literature that tests these theoretical models from an empirical point of view is vast and 
takes a spatial econometric approach (see Anselin, 1988). Among others, see for example: Figlio et al. 
(1999) who examine the simultaneous setting of welfare benefits for the U.S. case; Rork (2003) who 
analyses competition involving five types of tax (i.e. taxes on cigarettes, gasoline, personal income, 
general sales and corporate income) for the U.S. case; Devereux et al. (2006) who focus on excise taxes, 
again for the U.S. case, Devereux et al. (2008) and Overesch & Rincke (2011) who examine corporate 
taxes for the U.S. and the European cases, respectively. 
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benchmark framework presents no equalization scheme and is consistent with the results of 
Cremer & Gahvari (2000). Their most interesting result suggests that one way of partially 
circumventing the inefficient outcome of enforcement is to use a particular equalization scheme. 
By introducing a gross revenue sharing scheme, under which tax revenues are shared but 
auditing costs are borne fully by each region, an even more inefficient enforcement policy 
outcome is obtained. By considering instead a net revenue sharing scheme, under which both 
tax revenues and auditing costs are shared, the outcome is more efficient than both under the 
benchmark and the gross revenue sharing schemes. 
 
Janeba & Peters (1999) analyse the taxation of interest income in an economic union of two 
countries in the presence of tax evasion. In their setting, the enforcement effort is proxied by the 
treatment of the non-residents’ tax base. In fact, any state can decide whether to discriminate 
against the mobile tax base when setting the tax rate. The result is analogous to a prisoners’ 
dilemma. The authors show that if a sequential structure of the game is considered and any 
country has initially to decide whether or not to discriminate and then to set the level of the tax 
rates, an equilibrium will always exist: both countries discriminate by offering a lower tax rate 
to non-resident’s income with respect to that of the residents. In equilibrium this strategy will 
allow the mobile bases to evade taxation successfully. In this sense, a discrimination strategy is 
analogous to mobility-based competition in both enforcement policies and tax rates. If, by 
contrast, all countries harmonize their policies and decide not to discriminate, tax competition 
will lead to a lower level of tax evasion. This strategy is dominated by the one in which both 
countries discriminate and so cannot be reached in equilibrium.  
 
The literature on tax enforcement mobility-based competition, therefore, agrees on the 
impossibility of overcoming the inefficient outcome produced by audit policies by setting a 
harmonization policy, and, although some alternative strategies have been proposed, further 
research is needed in this field. In particular no empirical study has been conducted to test these 
models. Seen from this perspective, the case of wealth taxes seems to be particularly appropriate 
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for investigation. Indeed the literature suggests that the cost of levying these taxes in federal 
systems is significantly increased by both vertical and horizontal tax competition (Bird, 1991). 
In Australia and Canada, for instance, the coexistence of a federal and a sub-central gift and 
estate tax led to the abolishment of the former (in 1978 and 1972 respectively). This favoured 
the disappearance of the regional gift and estate tax too which succumbed (in 1983 in Australia 
and in 1986 in Canada) to the pressures of horizontal tax competition (Duff, 2005). In the U.S. 
the wealth transfer taxes (i.e., estate, inheritance and gift taxes depending on the state) have 
been repealed in 33 of the 48 contiguous states and their elimination is under discussion in the 
remaining 15. Conway & Rork (2004), drawing on historical elderly migration data, show that 
this is the result of a mobility-based competition process. The same process has occurred in the 
majority of Swiss cantons since the early 1990s and tax competition was the main argument in 
the political debate regarding these reforms (Brülhart & Parchet, 2011). 
  
The empirical evidence on wealth taxes confirms the presence of mobility-based competition in 
statutory tax parameters but the possibility that these interactions may also occur at the 
enforcement level has yet to be investigated. From this perspective, it is also useful to relate our 
analysis to the literature examining the determinants of tax administration. Although there is no 
agreement as to the objective function of a tax administration, the dominant approach sees it as 
a public agency that maximizes tax revenues (e.g. Shaw et al., 2009; Slemrod & Yitzhaki, 2002, 
1987). However, recent empirical papers suggest that political as well as budgetary variables 
play a role in determining a tax administration’s enforcement effort (see, for example, Young et 
al., 2001; Baretti et al., 2002; Esteller-Moré, 2005, 2011). 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of the behaviour of sub-central administration we 
undertake an empirical analysis of the case of the IGT. We fulfil this objective by developing a 
simple theoretical framework that allows us to set up the basic hypotheses for empirical testing. 
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3. The theoretical framework: “mobility-based” competition in presence of tax 
evasion 
Here, we consider mobility-based competition as a potential source of interdependence between 
sub-central tax administrations: we present a simple model of tax competition in the presence of 
tax evasion
10
. The framework is modelled as a federal state comprising two regions         of 
equal size in which the total population is normalized to one. At the regional level there are two 
institutional agents: the government that sets the tax rate          and the tax administration 
that controls the auditing probability         . Following the most common approach in the 
literature, we assume that the tax administration acts as a Leviathan and sets its audit policies so 
as to maximize total tax revenues. Since we are not interested in statutory tax parameter 
interactions we do not solve the government’s problem and take tax rates as given. Taxpayers 
decide the share         of wealth B to declare maximizing their utility. To ensure an interior 
solution, tax evasion is assumed to be costly for the individual. Moreover, taxpayers are neutral 
risk-averse in order to avoid any income effect. For the sake of simplicity, we do not develop 
the individual’s problem but the results are in line with the standard literature (see Allingham & 
Sandmo 1972; Cremer & Gahvari, 2000). The model is developed in two stages and the solution 
is provided by backward induction: 
 
1. Regional tax administrations set tax auditing policies. 
2. Individuals decide in which region of the federation to locate by comparing their 
indirect utility function (based on their current tax burden) in the two regions. This 
stage is solved by exploiting the concept of “home attachment” (see Mansoorian & 
Myers, 1993 and 1997).  
 
 
 
                                                     
10
 The model is based on Cremer & Gahvari (2000). 
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3.1 Stage 2: The decision as to which region to reside in  
To model the concept of “home” we assume that taxpayers are indexed by         and are 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1
11
. The preferences of taxpayer   with respect to his 
location are given by: 
 
     {
  
                                
  
                                       
                                                                                 
 
where   
    
               represents the (pecuniary) indirect utility function of an 
individual residing in region i = 1, 2
12
 and         indexes the individuals measuring the 
non-pecuniary (psychic) benefit they derive from living in region 2
13
. Thus, taxpayers indexed 
by   (  
 
 
) reside in region 1 while those identified by   (
 
 
  ) reside in region 2. The 
parameter          measures the degree of individual mobility and its interpretation is 
crucial. We assume   to represent the cost incurred when moving from the home region14. The 
taxpayer’s utility from living in his own region increases with the cost of mobility: if the costs 
are low (high) then the relative importance that the taxpayer assigns to the psychic part of the 
utility function, with respect to the pecuniary function, is low (high)
15
. The mobility equilibrium 
is characterized as: 
 
 
                                                     
11
 See Appendix 1 for a generalisation of the model that makes this assumption about the population 
distribution. 
12
 The direct utility function is defined as     [     [            ]        ]. 
where        is the exogenous tax penalty per unit of tax evaded and the function        
represents the cost of tax evasion      , such that           ,                        
  . 
13
 The psychic benefit from living in region 1is then expressed as      . 
14
 Since mobility could be either real or fictitious, this could be interpreted as the cost of actual mobility 
or the cost of making apparent a fictitious movement. 
15
 When the mobility cost is null       the tax bases become perfectly mobile: only the pecuniary part 
of the utility function matters in the taxpayer’s migration decision. By contrast, when the mobility costs 
are extremely high        the taxpayers are perfectly immobile. This can be interpreted as a 
centralized economy case in which a sole federal planner sets tax policies. These two limit cases are 
excluded to allow for imperfect mobility of individuals. 
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where      represents the marginal individual indifferent between living in region 1 and 
region 2 and, since ∫      
  
 
, it also represents the population in region 1 in the migration 
equilibrium: 
 
                     
 
 
 
  
    
 
  
 
 
 
 
  [           ]
  
                                  
 
where       [            ] is defined as the effective tax rate for the region  
     . For the sake of simplicity, the superscripts on the variables are omitted. The population 
in region 2 in the migration equilibrium is:  
 
   ∫    
 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 
3.2 Stage 1: Regional administrations set tax audit policies 
The problem is symmetric: the two administrations compete “à la Cournot” setting their tax 
policies. We develop the problem of administration 1. This administration faces the following 
problem given the governments’ decisions regarding tax rates and anticipating the results of the 
last stage: 
 
   
  
                         (
 
 
 
  [           ]
  
)  [          ] 
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where       represents the tax administration cost such that  
             
     and 
    
  
  
 [           ] is the unitary tax revenue. 
 
Since the two regions are symmetric, we can show that a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists, 
satisfying the following condition obtained from the first order condition (FOC) of the 
administrations. Hence                   and: 
 
         
                                                                                                                                         
 
The factor       represents the expected loss in the number of taxpayers due to an increase 
in  . So the right-hand side of equation (5) corresponds to the marginal mobility costs for the 
regional administration in terms of tax revenue losses due to an increase in  . The left-hand side 
represents the net marginal revenue due to an increase in  . 
 
By developing condition (5) we find that   
  
  
         
  (
  
  
 
  
  
)
 
. This shows us 
immediately that in the limit case of centralization       , the marginal mobility costs are 
null and that   
    : we are at the bliss point of the Laffer curve. Since the marginal mobility 
costs are positive, under decentralization            the tax auditing implementation is 
more costly. In fact, the net marginal tax revenue is positive    
     and tax enforcement is 
less severe than under centralisation: the threat of the mobility of the tax base tames the 
administration. This result replicates that reported by Cremer and Ghavari (2000). 
 
3.3 The slope of the reaction function and other comparative statics 
Since the purpose of this paper is to test empirically the presence of regional interdependence in 
the setting of tax audit policies, we wish to examine the process by which regional 
administrations reach the equilibrium level of audit probability. In other words, we are 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
12 
 
interested in evaluating the slope of the reaction function       . A non-null sign would 
highlight the presence of some kind of interaction between regions. It is easy to show that
16
: 
 
   
   
  
      
               
      
               
    
         
      
               
                                                    
 
The first term in the numerator of equation (6) represents the derivative of the population in 
region 1 with respect to the enforcement of region 2 and is positive: once region 2 increases its 
audit probability, some residents in region 2 will move to region 1. The second factor in the 
numerator represents the marginal unitary tax revenue that is positive under the FOC. 
According to the second order condition (SOC) of the administration’s problem the 
denominator of equation (6) is negative. The slope of the reaction function is then positive: the 
regional administrations set their audit strategies in a complementary fashion and so they are 
competing over this instrument in order to attract (or at least not to lose) their tax base. We test 
this result by means of econometric techniques. Our main research question can therefore be 
stated as follows: to what extent does the audit policy of each region depend on the enforcement 
strategies adopted by the other regions? Moreover, it is possible to show that  
 (
   
   
)
  
   (see 
Appendix 2 for details). This means that the competition between regions weakens as the 
mobility costs rise. Since it seems reasonable to assume that mobility costs will be positively 
correlated with the distance between regions, two distant regions will compete less than two 
regions that lie closer together. We explicitly take this into consideration when choosing the 
econometric strategy. 
 
A further result to emerge concerns the strategic relationship between    and   : 
 
                                                     
16
 For additional computations, please see Appendix 4 of the working paper version of this study            
(IEB Working Paper series 2012/005) downloadable at: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/en/2012022157/ieb/latest-
publications#.UHQCbk26eyo. 
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Expression (7) indicates that     and    are strategic complements; thus, if the government in 
one region reduces its statutory tax rate    , ceteris paribus, the administration in the competing 
region will unambiguously react by setting a lower audit rate    in order not to lose any of its 
tax base. We empirically test this result in the next section. As for the strategic relationship 
between the audit rate and the tax rate in the same region, it is not possible to establish 
unambiguously whether    and    are in fact strategic complements or strategic substitutes. We 
investigate this question in greater depth in our empirical analysis. 
 
In our model we do not explicitly consider any technological restrictions that might limit the 
discretion of the regional tax authorities to react freely to any policy change implemented by the 
competing region. In designing our empirical strategy, however, we relax this assumption. 
 
So far we have assumed the threat of tax base mobility to be the only source of interaction. In 
our empirical analysis we test an additional source of interdependence, namely the yardstick 
competition hypothesis (Besley & Case, 1995). This assumes that the interdependence in tax 
enforcement is the result of a mimicking process among neighbouring tax authorities aimed at 
seeking a larger share of votes, and hence ensuring re-election.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
In this section we provide a description of the database we have built to test the main 
hypotheses by means of an econometric model, finally we present and comment the main results 
emerging from the analysis. 
 
4.1 The empirical framework 
The theoretical framework presented in the previous section offers interesting insights that 
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require empirical testing: the horizontal tax competition model suggests that revenue- 
maximizing administrations set their audit policies in a complementary fashion, interacting so as 
not to lose tax bases. This result can be derived from equation    . To test it we estimate a 
spatial autoregressive panel model (see Anselin et al. 2008). 
 
Information about regional tax enforcement policies is released annually in the report, Informe 
sobre la cesión de tributos a las Comunidades Autónomas, published together with the Spanish 
National Budget, Proyecto de Presupuestos Generales del Estado. The report registers the 
number of audits performed each year by each region (        ) together with the number of 
tax returns received       , information that is used to define our endogenous variable. The 
basic model to be estimated is the following: 
 
                                                                                            
 
In order to make the dependent variable comparable across small and large regions we employ 
the audit rate defined as     
        
    
. The term           ∑    
 
            is the spatial 
lag of the endogenous variable and     is the spatial weight that describes the relative 
interdependence of regions   and   in such a way that       if     and       if     . 
Specifically, we employ a spatial matrix based on the inverse of the distance between regional 
capitals. The choice is made on the basis of the results of the theoretical model: when the 
distance between two regions – a proxy of mobility costs – increases we observe a lower level 
of competition in terms of their auditing policies
17
. More precisely in order to define     for 
                                                     
17
 While the recent literature suggests that a change in the spatial matrix is not crucial (LeSage & Pace 
2010), in our case the model can be assumed to be better specified than one based on a simple natural 
neighbours matrix because the Spanish state includes a number of islands, the presence of which makes 
the definition of neighbours arbitrary (see, for example, Costa-Font & Pons-Novell, 2007). However, to 
check robustness we also replicate the analysis employing alternative spatial matrixes. 
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    we use the inverse squared distance and we apply a spectral-normalization18 to the weights 
(see Drukker, et al., 2011). The standard practice in the literature is to adopt a “row 
standardization” to normalize the spatial matrix, meaning that the sums of the spatial weights in 
each row are standardized so that they add up to 1. This procedure is appropriate in most cases. 
However, applying this procedure with inverse distance based matrixes is more controversial. In 
fact, the explanatory role of distance could be weakened: row standardization makes the 
distances relative rather than absolute, i.e. within each row inverse distances are scaled to a row-
specific scale of 0 to 1. Thus, row standardization does not change the relative weight that the 
CAs exert on other units within the same row, but it does change it across rows with the result 
that the spatial lag coefficients may be biased (see e.g. Ghinamo et al., 2010). For this reason 
we employ a spectral normalization technique which, by normalizing the spatial weights by the 
same scalar, preserves symmetry and basic model specifications such as the explanatory role of 
distance
19
.  So the term        accounts for potential strategic competition in audit policies. 
According to the theoretical framework, eq.    , we expect   to be positive.  
 
To account for the potential impact of modifications to the statutory tax parameters, we include 
a dummy (     ) equal to one if the regional government   makes a marked deduction in favour 
of the most common heirs during the year  20. These modifications to the deduction regime 
substantially reduce the level of the effective tax rate and there is evidence that they induce a 
convergence process among regions compatible with a race to the bottom (Durán-Cabré & 
Esteller-Moré 2009, 2010). We can then interpret a       value equal to 1 as a modification to 
the corresponding regional statutory tax parameters that results in a less severe tax rate. As such 
                                                     
18
 In a spectral-normalized matrix, the (i, j)th element of W becomes w
*
ij = wij/v, where v is the largest of 
the moduli of the eigenvalues of W. 
19
 As an alternative we also employed a minmax-normalized matrix (see Drukker, et al., 2011) where the 
(i, j)th element of W becomes w
*
ij = wij/m and m = min(max(ri),max(ci)), with max(ri) being the largest 
row sum of W and max(ci) being the largest column sum of W. We do not report the results because they 
are qualitatively unaffected but they are available on request. 
20
 The main heirs are the spouse, descendants/ascendants who with this rule enjoy almost complete 
exemption. For details on the normative aspect of the exemption regime see Durán-Cabré and Esteller-
Moré (2009, 2010). 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
16 
 
this variable picks up the strategic interaction between the tax instruments controlled by the tax 
authority and the government of that same region, respectively. In line with what was 
previously stated a positive (negative) coefficient would indicate that these instruments are 
substitutes (complements). Finally, we control for       , which represents the weighted 
average of the neighbours’ deduction policies. In line with the above reasoning, an increase in 
this variable is compatible with a decrease in the weighted average of the neighbours’ tax 
burden. Thus according to the theoretical model (equation (7)), we expect the coefficient of this 
variable to be negative: a higher        would correspond to a decreasing audit rate. 
 
Tax administration policies might also be sensitive to “technological”, “political” and 
“budgetary” effects (see e.g. Esteller-Moré, 2005, 2011 and Young, et al., 2001), as well as to 
other elements for which we control. From the technological perspective, it is reasonable to 
assume that the number of inspections that has to be performed is established by the regional tax 
authorities conditional on its workload. We can define the workload as the ratio between the 
number of tax returns received        and the number of inspectors employed in the office 
              
21
. As such, these variables express the technological restrictions a regional tax 
authority faces in terms of its size and structure
 22
. We include      and              separately 
in our regression in order to incorporate the effect of workload changes in a flexible manner. 
These variables together with the endogenous variable are expressed in logs in order to evaluate 
directly the elasticity of     with respect to      and              . 
 
As for the political elements that might influence the tax administration we employ 
               , a dummy variable equal to one if there is an election in region   during the 
                                                     
21
 The number of inspectors is also taken from the report Informe sobre la cesión de tributos a las 
Comunidades Autónomas. The variable              is defined as “number of normalized inspectors”: 
the number of staff members engaged in tax enforcement is conventionally calculated as the weighted 
sum of inspectors and sub-inspectors considered in function of the months effectively worked.  
22
 More specifically      is a measure of the size of the tax administration in terms of the amount of work 
it has to process while              denotes the size of the regional tax authority in terms of the 
personnel employed in enforcement. 
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year  , in order to control for the electoral cycle.                      is another dummy 
equal to one if the party in office in a specific region and year is on the left of the political 
spectrum.  
 
In the case of the economic or budgetary effects we employ three main variables. We use per 
capita GDP to control for the regional economic cycle and tax capacity. The per capita deficit 
and the total amount of transfers received from the central government divided by total regional 
expenditure are introduced to account for further relevant budgetary factors.  
 
We control for any unobserved factors that might be correlated with the rest of the 
predetermined variables by including a set of fixed effects,   . It would be recommendable to 
control for common shocks by means of time dummies, but this is not generally feasible in this 
model because it reduces the identification of the spatial lag coefficient (see Devereux et al. 
(2008), p. 1224). By way of an alternative, we include individual time trends,   . Finally,      is 
the error term. 
 
We enrich the model in order to gain a better understanding of the extent to which the reforms 
first implemented in Spain in the mid-nineties have affected the horizontal interdependence in 
tax auditing. More specifically in order to disentangle the role of either one of the two reforms 
that progressively gave greater tax legislative power to the regional governments, we employ a 
model in which we interact the spatial lag with a dummy associated with the first wave of 
decentralization (        ) and another dummy that identifies the second reform (2002) 
(        )
23
. 
 
                                                     
23
 We also estimate two alternative models. In order to test whether the spatial lag is affected by the 
decentralization process as a whole, we interact the spatial lag with         , a dummy equal to one for 
years posterior to the first IGT reform (1997). With the purpose of emphasizing the effects of the second 
IGT reform on the process of enforcement competition, we estimate one final model where the spatial lag 
is interacted solely with         . The aim in this case is to emphasize the effects of the second IGT 
reform on the process of enforcement competition. 
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If   and  , the coefficients of the interaction terms in equation (9), are found to be negative 
(positive), this would mean that following the reforms that gradually decentralized legislative 
power vis-à-vis statutory tax parameters, the regions began to compete less (more) regarding 
their auditing policies. The impact of the second reform on the consequent race to the bottom in 
statutory tax parameters was much more important than that one resulting from the first reform; 
hence, we expect this second reform to have a stronger influence on audit policies (i.e. we 
expect | |  | |). 
 
4.2 Estimation strategy 
As is well known, the spatial lag term is typically correlated with the disturbance terms and so 
must be treated as an endogenous variable and accurately estimated. It should be noted in this 
respect that OLS or within-group estimators are biased and inconsistent due to the simultaneity 
bias (see Anselin, 1988 p. 58). In order to deal with this problem, we employ the standard 
instrumental variable (IV) approach (see Kelejian & Robinson, 1993 and Kelejian & Prucha, 
1998). While other techniques, such as the maximum likelihood (ML) approach, are available 
(see Brueckner, 2003, for details), IV estimation provides consistent estimates even in the 
presence of spatially correlated error terms (Kelejian and Prucha, 1998; Brueckner, 2003) and 
offers the advantage of computational ease. Thus, in line with the literature (see e.g. Figlio et 
al., 1999; Fredriksson & Millimet, 2002; Fredriksson et al., 2004; Millimet & Rangaprasad 
2007), we use a subset of the exogenous explanatory variables in equation (8) as instruments, 
employing the same weighting scheme for the instruments as that used for the spatial lag. We 
repeat this procedure with equation (9) instrumenting as above the interaction terms. 
 
 We opted for the generalized method of moments (GMM-IV) approach as our main estimation 
strategy since, according to Baum et al. (2003), it is more efficient than the two-stage least 
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squares estimation (2SLS) in the presence of heteroskedastic errors. We also report jackknife 
two-stage least squares (JN2SLS) and Fuller (1977) estimators, which outperform the other 
options particularly in the presence of weak instruments and do not suffer from small sample 
biases (Hahn et al., 2004). Several diagnostic tests are reported to evaluate the reliability of the 
instruments employed. In order to test the instruments’ validity we performed the Hansen 
(1982) test of overidentifying restrictions, and we also report the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) test 
for the underidentification of the equation and, finally, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic when 
testing the weakness of the instruments
24
. 
 
4.3 Data, sources and descriptive statistics 
Our panel comprises information about the 15 Spanish “common regime” Autonomous 
Communities
25
 for the period 1987-2009
26
. With the exception of the endogenous variable and 
the number of inspectors discussed above, the other variables are obtained from the following 
statistical sources. The    -             is provided by the Spanish National Institute of 
Statistics (INE). The variable    -                is the deficit expected at the beginning of 
the fiscal year expressed in relation to population and it is extracted from the database 
maintained by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The                         is 
constructed as the ratio between the total amount of transfers received from the central 
government (extracted from the INE database) and the total regional expenditure (extracted 
from the Ministry of Economy and Finance database). The information on election years is 
obtained from the Interior Ministry’s website (http://goo.gl/YCS3J) while the information about 
the political colour of each regional government, required to construct the dummy 
                    , is obtained from Zarate’s Political Collections website 
                                                     
24
 We also report the range of critical values for the Stock & Yogo (2005) weak identification test. 
25
 The Communities of Navarre and the Basque Country form part of the Foral System, which grants 
them independence in their laws and tax administrations. For this reason information about them is not 
available and they are not included in the paper. 
26
 We do not have any information about the administration policies of 1993, as in 1995 the budget had 
not been approved and data about ceded taxes is two-year lagged. Auditing information for the Madrid 
Community became available in 1996, the year in which it was granted this administrative power. 
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(http://zarate.eu/spain2.htm). The information used to construct the dummy      , which 
accounts for the introduction of IGT deductions, is taken from Durán-Cabré & Esteller-Moré 
(2009). In Table 1 we report a summary statistics: 
 
[TABLE 1] 
 
The statistics concerning the audit rate specifically state that the probability of an inspection 
ranges from a minimum of 0.005% to a maximum of 20% with a mean value of 2%. In Graph 1 
we plot a scatter diagram of the IGT audit rate in the Spanish regions together with the 
evolution in the rate’s mean and standard deviation. The data show a reduction in the dispersion 
and mean across regions during the period. Indeed, it seems that a convergence process takes 
place and that this in turn is coherent with the hypothesis of a race to the bottom in tax 
enforcement. 
 
[GRAPH 1] 
 
5. Main results 
In Table 2 we report the results of the model expressed in equation (8). As discussed above, the 
model is estimated using four different estimation techniques, namely, GMM-IV, 2SLS, 
JN2SLS and the Fuller estimator. We also report by way of a baseline estimation a model 
without the spatial lag and a model in which the spatial lag is not instrumented. In all the models 
the spatial lag coefficient is positive and significant, which confirms that horizontal interactions 
between regional administrations do take place when audit policies are set. This, in turn, is 
consistent with the hypothesis of tax competition adopted in the theoretical model and with the 
previous literature on tax competition.  
 
As for the other variables, we find that           is significant and the correspondent 
coefficient is negative, i.e. that the elasticity of the audit rate with respect to the number of tax 
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returns is negative. This means that ceteris paribus a variation of 1% in the number of tax 
returns corresponds to a variation of about -1.8% in the audit rate. Thus, for a given number of 
inspectors, an increase in their workload corresponds to a decrease in the auditing rate due to a 
lower share of audited tax returns. A further significant result is found with regard to the 
number of inspectors. The elasticity of     with respect to              is positive indicating 
that ceteris paribus an increase of 1% in the number of inspectors corresponds to an increase of 
about 0.3% in the audit rate. This means that, for a given level of workload, increasing the 
number of inspectors results in higher tax enforcement. Thus, these two results suggest that the 
regional tax authorities are undersized and that the inspectors are overwhelmed by the quantity 
of work or it might be that it is not financially worthwhile expanding the activity of enforcement 
any further
27
. 
 
In the case of the control variables, we find a significant and negative effect of      on the 
audit probability: the introduction of a deduction scheme reduces the audit rate by about 0.5%.  
This result might indicate that once a region introduces a deduction scheme in favour of the 
main heirs (who as such enjoy virtual exemption from the tax), the need to enforce their tax 
returns decreases significantly. None of the other controls is found to be significant. More 
specifically, the signs of the estimates of the per-capita deficit and the transfers-expenditure 
ratio are as expected, but they are not statistically significant
28
. 
 
Inspection of the diagnostic test performed to confirm the reliability of the instruments 
employed shows that our equation is never underidentified and that the instruments are valid, 
although there is some evidence that they have a weak explanatory power. For this reason we 
                                                     
27
 The optimal size of the tax administration is not readily determined. The problem has been addressed 
by equating the marginal social benefit of reduced evasion to the marginal resource cost (Slemrod & 
Yitzhaki, 1987, 2002), which is calculated by assigning a shadow price to the work and time a tax 
inspector employs in selecting, processing and inspecting a tax return (Yitzhaki, & Vakneen, 1989). 
28
 We performed further analyses (available on request) in order to test whether the relationship of the 
per-capita deficit and the transfers-expenditure ratio with the tax enforcement was nonlinear but the 
qualitative results remained unchanged. 
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opted also to employ the Fuller estimator as this performs well even in the presence of weak 
instruments. 
 
 [TABLE 2] 
 
In Table 3 we perform various interactions so as to highlight the possible influence of the 
decentralization process on regional tax enforcement policies. In the first regression we interact 
the spatial lag with a dummy that captures the effect of the complete period of decentralization 
beginning in 1997 without differentiating between sub-periods. In column (2) we seek to 
disentangle the specific effect of each reform. As expected, the second reform has had a 
stronger impact on auditing competition. Indeed, both in models 2 and 3 the interaction term 
identifying the effect of the second reform on tax enforcement competition is negative and 
significant, while the effects of the first reform are statistically insignificant. For this reason, in 
column (3), we exclude the interaction with the period 1997-2001 (first reform). All in all, the 
second wave of decentralization of the normative power has attenuated enforcement 
competition, although there is still evidence of positive interdependence in this policy. 
Interestingly, it seems that after the second reform there has been a switch in the instruments 
over which regions compete. 
 [TABLE 3] 
 
6. Further results 
6.1 Alternative weighting matrixes 
In this section we perform an additional analysis and apply a different weighting scheme to the 
endogenous variable to define the spatial lag. Specifically, we apply two alternative weighting 
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matrixes: a neighbours’ matrix29 and a uniform matrix in which we suppose that any one region 
interacts with any other region in the same way and so assign a weight equal to one to each CA. 
We then apply a spectral normalization to each region. We estimate equation (11) using a 
GMM-IV estimator. In Table 4 we present the results of this analysis. 
 
[TABLE 4] 
 
The first matrix (model 2) is an alternative way of defining the competition between regions, i.e. 
assuming that one region competes solely with its neighbours. The results of this model are 
qualitatively equivalent to those obtained when employing an inverse-of-the-squared-distance 
weighting matrix. Indeed, the spatial lag is still significant and positive corroborating the 
horizontal competition hypothesis. More specifically, we can also confirm previous findings 
concerning the control variables. The last model is underpinned by a hypothesis that is more 
general with respect to horizontal competition. In other words, what we seek to test is the 
presence of common intellectual trends as an additional source of interdependence likely to be 
found in conjunction with mobility-based competition. Here, we suppose that regional tax 
authorities might mimic each other’s innovative procedures in the enforcement process. For this 
reason we employ a uniform matrix that should collect all kinds of interdependence as regards 
tax enforcement that occur between regions. We obtain a positive and significant coefficient for 
the spatial lag that supports the presence of alternative sources of interaction, such as common 
intellectual trends. 
 
6.2 Testing the yardstick competition hypothesis 
We test the yardstick competition hypothesis by employing a GMM-IV approach and the 
standard neighbours’ matrix for the estimation of equation (11). As Bordignon et al. suggest: 
                                                     
29
 As previously stated (see footnote 15), a simple, natural neighbours’ matrix makes the definition of 
neighbours quite arbitrary in our case due to the presence of islands. Nevertheless, and due to their 
proximity, we assume the Balearic Islands to be neighbours of the Valencian CA and Catalonia and the 
Canary Islands to be neighbours of Andalucía. 
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“the crucial point about testing yardstick competition theory is not about local tax setting 
behaviour as such, but in tax setting as linked to the incentives and constraints that are generated 
by the local electoral system” (Bordignon et al. 2004, p. 332). As for the identification strategy, 
Besley & Case’s (1995) seminal paper proposes distinguishing local governments according to 
their eligibility to be re-elected. In the presence of term limits, governments that are not eligible 
for re-election are not expected to react to their neighbours’ policy changes.  
 
Unfortunately, this strategy is not available to us, since in Spain there are no term limits. 
However, other elements taken into account elsewhere in the literature have included the impact 
of the election year and the electoral margin (see e.g. Solé-Ollé, 2003; Bartolini & Santolini, 
2012, or Esteller-Moré & Rizzo, 2014). In the presence of elections, the government’s reaction 
to its neighbours’ policy is expected to be greater; by contrast, an incumbent party with a large 
electoral margin is expected to show little reaction to its neighbours’ policy. We use these two 
elements of the electoral system to test the yardstick competition hypothesis. As such, we 
interact the spatial lag alternatively with electoral dummies and the electoral margin (defined as 
the number of seats in the parliament obtained by the party/coalition in government minus the 
seats necessary to obtain the majority divided by the total seats in the parliament), respectively. 
The results of these analyses are reported in Table 5. 
 
[TABLE 5] 
 
While the ‘un-interacted’ spatial lag coefficient is still significant and positive in all 
specifications, confirming the presence of interdependence, the coefficients of the interacted 
terms are not significantly different from zero. These results suggest that yardstick competition 
does not represent a relevant source of interaction for explaining IGT enforcement 
interdependence. 
 
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
25 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we have analysed the presence of another level of tax interdependence that may 
occur in federal contexts: horizontal competition between regional administrations in their 
enforcement policies, which hitherto has not been empirically analysed in the literature. By 
applying a theoretical framework, we derive a regional audit reaction function that is positively 
sloped: regional administrations compete in their auditing policies. This result has been tested in 
the Spanish framework by means of spatial econometric techniques, whose outcomes 
corroborate the theory; specifically the coefficients for the spatial lag are compatible with the 
hypothesis of horizontal competition in tax enforcement. This is our main contribution, which is 
in line with Cremer and Gahvari’s results (2000).  
 
Our empirical evidence also suggests that if the decentralization process is gradually 
implemented and administrative responsibility is decentralized before the normative power, 
enforcement policy competition decreases when it becomes possible to compete in terms of 
more powerful instruments, i.e. the statutory tax parameters. Thus, a highly decentralized 
framework seems to provoke a switch from a situation of more opaque competition to one that 
is more transparent. A further interesting finding concerns the workload of the regional tax 
authorities. Our estimations suggest that the elasticity of the auditing rate with respect to the 
amount of work that has to be processed is negative, while the elasticity with respect to the 
number of inspectors is positive. This means that regional tax authorities are undersized and that 
the inspectors are overwhelmed by the quantity of work, although it might hide the fact that it is 
not financially worthwhile expanding the activity of enforcement any further. 
  
From a normative perspective, Cremer and Gahvari (2000) suggest that in the presence of 
horizontal competition, as auditing strategies are not easily observable, it might be difficult for 
the central government to intervene establishing a binding agreement between sub-central 
governments aimed at harmonizing their strategies. This makes it unfeasible to avoid sub-
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optimal levels in tax enforcement
30
. Therefore, although opaque competition in tax enforcement 
is difficult to evaluate, it seems that it is less desirable than a more transparent competition in 
statutory tax parameters. Moreover, although the problem of sub-optimal tax enforcement could 
in part be circumvented by a further decentralization of the normative power, having 
decentralized both instruments it might not be optimal because both forms of competition may 
lead to a race to the bottom and inefficiently low levels of tax instruments. Intuitively, the more 
instruments there are to compete with, the lower the tax revenues. In this framework it would be 
much easier to obtain a coordination agreement in order to harmonize the regional tax rates, but 
such a policy would implicitly restore the original context of opaque competition in tax 
enforcement. Hence it seems that, in our framework, imposing a coordination strategy is not the 
appropriate way to avoid the inefficiencies associated with horizontal externalities. 
 
 
  
                                                     
30
 Indeed, even if the policies were publicly observable (because, for instance, they were recorded in a 
publicly available report, as is the case in Spain), whether a specific region’s enforcement effort is 
sufficient or not is not readily established. A low audit rate might be interpreted as being inefficient 
simply because it is low while it is actually low as a result of improvements that have ensured that the 
enforcement effort is much more precise and efficient. 
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TABLES AND GRAPHS: 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Measurement unit Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Β audit rate 307 0.02 0.03 5×10-5 0.20 
TR number of tax returns  308 21187 18234.62 1641 88528 
Inspectors number of inspectors 308 5.98 5.70 1×10
-8
 32.80 
Per Capita GDP thousands of 2001 euro per capita  322 11.53 5.50 2.17 23.02 
Per Capita Deficit thousands of 2001 euro per capita  308 -0.03 0.08 -0.54 0.43 
Transfers/Expenditure share of expenditure financed by transfers 294 0.40 0.13 0.11 1.37 
Election year dummy for elections 322 0.25 0.44 0 1 
Leftist government dummy for leftist government 322 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Deduction dummy for deduction schemes 322 0.13 0.34 0 1 
 
 
Graph 1: Dispersion of the audit rate 
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Table 2: Tax audit interdependence  
Spatial matrix: Inverse of the squared distance with spectral normalization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimator Within-
FE 
Within-
FE 
GMM-
IV 
2SLS JN2SLS FULLER(4) 
 Log(β) Log(β) Log(β) Log(β) Log(β) Log(β) 
Spatial Lag - 0.635** 0.689*** 0.724*** 0.724** 0.732*** 
 - (3.006) (2.762) (2.822) (2.570) (2.660) 
Log(TR) -1.108 -
1.774** 
-1.847** -1.851** -1.851** -1.858** 
 (-1.181) (-2.254) (-2.391) (-2.324) (-1.994) (-2.315) 
Log(Inspectors) 0.300** 0.302** 0.303*** 0.304*** 0.304 0.304*** 
 (2.310) (2.597) (3.086) (3.090) (0.424) (3.092) 
Per-Capita GDP -0.096 0.031 0.063 0.054 0.054 0.056 
 (-0.646) (0.192) (0.577) (0.485) (0.281) (0.489) 
Per-Capita Deficit 0.495 1.431 1.536 1.542 1.542 1.552 
 (0.471) (1.287) (1.604) (1.597) (1.379) (1.599) 
Transfers/Expenditure -1.950 -1.328 -1.022 -1.247 -1.247 -1.240 
 (-1.284) (-1.033) (-1.184) (-1.417) (-1.071) (-1.402) 
Election year -0.072 -0.104 -0.079 -0.105 -0.105 -0.105 
 (-0.827) (-1.041) (-0.524) (-0.689) (-0.624) (-0.690) 
Leftist government -0.395 -0.319 -0.439** -0.315 -0.315 -0.314 
 (-1.617) (-1.279) (-2.051) (-1.372) (-1.187) (-1.369) 
Deduction -
0.841*** 
-
0.490** 
-0.461* -0.468* -0.468 -0.466* 
 (-3.061) (-2.335) (-1.814) (-1.830) (-1.562) (-1.818) 
WDeduction - 0.247 0.352 0.414 0.414 0.428 
 - (0.311) (0.583) (0.667) (0.587) (0.664) 
_cons 6.479 14.740*     
 (0.735) (1.970)     
Observations 279 266 266 266 266 266 
R
2
 0.16 0.29 - - - - 
Shea’s Partial R2 - - 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Underidentification test (H0: equation underidentified) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic 
- - 36.762 36.762 36.762 36.762 
(p-value) - - 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weak identification test (H0: instruments are weak) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic - - 8.803 8.803 8.803 8.803 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test 
range of critical values 
- - 5.15-
19.28 
5.15-
19.28 
5.15-
19.28 
3.63-5.61 
Validity test (H0: instruments are valid) 
Hansen J statistic χ2 - - 5.222 5.222 5.222 5.204 
(p-value) - - 0.389 0.389 0.389 0.391 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Fixed effects & time trends in all specifications. 
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Table 3: Tax audit interdependence – Interactions 
Spatial matrix: Inverse of the squared distance with spectral normalization 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimator GMM-IV GMM-IV GMM-IV 
 Log(β) Log(β) Log(β) 
Spatial Lag 0.917*** 0.833*** 0.829*** 
 (5.236) (5.284) (3.183) 
Spatial Lag×Post96 -0.071 - - 
 (-0.741) - - 
Spatial Lag×D97-01 - 0.001 - 
 - (0.005) - 
Spatial Lag×Post01 - -0.191* -0.262*** 
 - (-1.855) (-2.720) 
Log(TR) -2.020*** -1.917*** -2.051*** 
 (-2.594) (-2.642) (-2.775) 
Log(Inspectors) 0.317*** 0.311*** 0.307*** 
 (3.252) (3.254) (3.162) 
Per-Capita GDP 0.068 0.024 0.007 
 (0.792) (0.333) (0.086) 
Per-Capita Deficit 1.423 1.990** 1.848** 
 (1.444) (2.223) (2.052) 
Transfers/Expenditure -0.818 -0.826 -0.735 
 (-0.963) (-1.049) (-1.020) 
Election year -0.053 -0.017 0.038 
 (-0.372) (-0.130) (0.274) 
Leftist government -0.373 -0.128 -0.108 
 (-1.631) (-0.586) (-0.479) 
Deduction -0.437* -0.312 -0.412 
 (-1.701) (-1.224) (-1.600) 
WDeduction 0.646 0.195 0.020 
 (1.236) (0.451) (0.040) 
Post96 -0.279 - - 
 (-0.640) - - 
D97-01 - -0.090 - 
 - (-0.206) - 
Post01 - -1.227** -1.538*** 
 - (-2.216) (-3.359) 
Observations 266 266 266 
Shea’s Partial R2 (Spatial Lag) 0.50 0.47 0.17 
Shea’s Partial R2 (Spatial Lag×Post96) 0.93 - - 
Shea’s Partial R2 (Spatial Lag×D97-01) - 0.94 - 
Shea’s Partial R2 (Spatial Lag×Post01) - 0.93 0.90 
Underidentification test (H0: equation underidentified)    
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 67.835 64.453 30.056 
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weak identification test (H0: instruments are weak)    
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 18.201 10.580 4.710 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test range of critical values 19.40-4.59 19.29-4.32 18.76-4.66 
Validity test (H0: instruments are valid)    
Hansen J statistic χ2 9.762 21.148 6.289 
(p-value) 0.462 0.132 0.615 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Fixed effects & time trends in all specifications. 
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Table 4: Tax audit interdependence; Alternative weighting matrixes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Spatial Matrix Inverse of 
squared distance 
Neighbours Uniform 
Estimator GMM-IV GMM-IV GMM-IV 
 Log(β) Log(β) Log(β) 
Spatial Lag 0.689*** 0.737*** 0.969*** 
 (2.762) (3.663) (7.033) 
Log(TR) -1.847** -1.330* -2.252*** 
 (-2.391) (-1.914) (-3.363) 
Log(Inspectors) 0.303*** 0.288*** 0.295*** 
 (3.086) (3.119) (3.425) 
Per-Capita GDP 0.063 0.000 0.011 
 (0.577) (0.000) (0.119) 
Per-Capita Deficit 1.536 1.587* 2.083** 
 (1.604) (1.704) (2.118) 
Transfers/Expenditure -1.022 -0.113 -0.351 
 (-1.184) (-0.133) (-0.568) 
Election year -0.079 -0.076 -0.058 
 (-0.524) (-0.510) (-0.482) 
Leftist government -0.439** -0.415** 0.050 
 (-2.051) (-2.058) (0.245) 
Deduction -0.461* -0.296 0.052 
 (-1.814) (-1.086) (0.206) 
WDeduction 0.352 -0.131 -0.374 
 (0.583) (-0.230) (-0.553) 
Observations 266 266 266 
Shea’s Partial R2 0.18 0.22 0.63 
Underidentification test (H0: equation underidentified) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 36.762 40.919 70.509 
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weak identification test (H0: instruments are weak) 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 8.803 11.145 66.872 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test range of critical 
values 
5.15-19.28 5.15-19.28 5.15-19.28 
Validity test (H0: instruments are valid) 
Hansen J statistic χ2 5.222 8.320 8.144 
(p-value) 0.389 0.139 0.148 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Fixed effects & time trends in all specifications. 
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Table 5: Tax audit interdependence; Testing the yardstick competition hypothesis 
Spatial matrix: Neighbours with spectral normalization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spatial Matrix Neighbours Neighbours Neighbours Neighbours 
Estimator GMM-IV GMM-IV GMM-IV GMM-IV 
Spatial Lag 0.737*** 0.756*** 0.577*** 0.622*** 
 (3.663) (4.055) (3.009) (3.614) 
Spatial Lag× Election year - 0.042 - - 
 - (0.551) - - 
Spatial Lag× Election year (-1) - - -0.080 - 
 - - (-1.035) - 
Spatial Lag× Electoral Margin - - - -0.000 
 - - - (-0.007) 
Log(TR) -1.330* -1.736*** -1.400** -1.341* 
 (-1.914) (-2.592) (-2.279) (-1.957) 
Log(Inspectors) 0.288*** 0.285*** 0.317*** 0.290*** 
 (3.119) (3.095) (3.071) (3.347) 
Per-Capita GDP 0.000 0.033 0.021 -0.017 
 (0.000) (0.340) (0.205) (-0.180) 
Per-Capita Deficit 1.587* 1.447 1.638* 1.429 
 (1.704) (1.546) (1.894) (1.625) 
Transfers/Expenditure -0.113 -0.152 -0.873 -0.454 
 (-0.133) (-0.177) (-1.108) (-0.587) 
Election year -0.076 0.179 - - 
 (-0.510) (0.501) - - 
Leftist government - - -0.342 - 
 - - (-0.944) - 
Deduction -0.415** -0.296 -0.401* -0.385** 
 (-2.058) (-1.455) (-1.950) (-2.000) 
WDeduction -0.296 -0.364 -0.293 -0.324 
 (-1.086) (-1.312) (-1.127) (-1.264) 
 -0.131 -0.226 0.097 -0.312 
 (-0.230) (-0.395) (0.192) (-0.565) 
Electoral Margin - - - -0.032 
 - - - (-1.553) 
Observations 266 266 238 266 
Shea’s Partial R2 (Spatial Lag) 0.22 0.28 0.44 0.32 
Shea’s Partial R2 (Spatial Lag× Election year) - 0.89 - - 
Shea’s Partial R2 (Spatial Lag× Election year -1) - - 0.91 - 
Shea’s Partial R2 (Spatial Lag× Electoral Margin)        - 
 
- - 0.89 
Underidentification test (H0: equation underidentified)   
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 40.919 31.507 51.304 54.387 
(p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Weak identification test (H0: instruments are weak)    
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 11.145 7.919 13.997 9.662 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test range of critical 
values 
5.15-19.28 4.62-19.12 4.62-19.12 4.62-19.12 
Validity test (H0: instruments are valid)    
Hansen J statistic χ2 8.320 13.927 10.654 13.504 
(p-value) 0.139 0.125 0.300 0.141 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Fixed effects & time trends in all specifications. 
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Appendix 1: Generalized results with non-uniform distribution of taxpayers 
We assume that the distribution of taxpayers along the home attachment is not uniform, i.e. we 
assume that                 where      represents a generic density function.  
The value                   
 
 
 
  
    
 
  
 represents the marginal individual indifferent to 
living in either region 1 or region 2. Below    we have all the taxpayers that settle in region 1, 
while above    there are all the taxpayers that live in region 2. The respective shares of each 
group are       ∫       
  
 
 and         ∫       
 
  
. 
At stage 1 the problem of the administration of region 1 becomes: 
   
  
                   [          ]                   
The FOC of this problem is:  
                 
 
  
                                                                                      
The SOC is: 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
The slope of the reaction function becomes: 
   
   
  
                  
                  
                                                                                                                     
This is positive as long as          
31
. 
 
  
                                                     
31
 This condition is satisfied if the median of the population distribution (  ) coincides with or is higher 
than the mode of the distribution. This condition can usually be satisfied. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
38 
 
Appendix 2: Comparative statics on    
It is possible to express 
   
   
 as a function of   in order to perform a comparative statics analysis: 
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where:  
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And 
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So under FOC and SOC,    and: 
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